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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Quad/Graphics Inc. appeals from the 
judgment of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court’s confirmation of One2One Communications, LLC’s 
(the “Debtor”) Chapter 11 plan of reorganization and 
dismissing Appellant’s bankruptcy appeal as equitably moot.  
Appellant contends that the District Court abused its 
discretion in dismissing its appeal as equitably moot.  
Appellant also asks us to use this appeal to overrule our 
adoption of equitable mootness in In re Continental Airlines, 
91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (‘‘Continental’’), 
contending that the doctrine is unconstitutional and contrary 
to the Bankruptcy Code.  Continental remains the law of this 
circuit.  This panel is not free to overturn a precedential 
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opinion.  In the absence of an en banc reversal, we are bound 
by Continental.  Because the District Court abused its 
discretion under Continental, we will reverse the District 
Court’s judgment and remand for consideration of the merits 
of Appellant’s bankruptcy appeal. 
I. Background 
 
The Debtor, a billing services technology company, is 
a limited liability business and its sole member is Joli, Inc.  
Joanne Heverly owns seventy-five percent of Joli, Inc., and 
Richard Brammer, a former officer of the Debtor, owns the 
remaining twenty-five percent.  Appellant, a printing 
company, holds the single largest claim against the Debtor 
and the Debtor’s CEO, Bruce Heverly, husband of Joanne 
Heverly, for $9,359,630.91, which stems from a judgment 
entered in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin.1  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has since affirmed that judgment.  See Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. 
One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 529 F. App’x 784, 793 (7th Cir. 
2013).    
The Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the United State Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 
101 et seq. (the “Bankruptcy Code”), in the Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”).  
Thereafter, the Office of the United States Trustee formed an 
official unsecured creditors committee (the “Committee”) 
                                              
1 The Debtor’s unsecured claims, not including 
Appellant’s claim, total less than $1.3 million.    
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consisting of Appellant, Ricoh Production Print Solutions, 
LLC, and Enterprise Group. 
Between September 2012 and January 2014, the 
Debtor filed the First,2 Second, and Third Amended Plans of 
Reorganization.  After the Bankruptcy Court denied 
confirmation of the First Amended Plan of Reorganization, 
Bela Szigethy (“Szigethy”) agreed to make an investment in 
the Debtor.3  The Debtor filed a Fourth Amended Plan of 
Reorganization (the “Plan”) on January 25, 2013, under 
which a third-party, One2One Holdings, LLC (“Plan 
Sponsor”) would acquire a membership interest in the Debtor.  
The Plan incorporated a Plan Support Agreement which 
provided the Plan Sponsor with the exclusive right to 
purchase 100% of the Debtor’s equity for $200,000.  Neither 
the Plan Sponsor nor any third-party was to contribute any 
additional capital to fund the Plan.  The Plan also 
incorporated the terms of the Committee Agreement with 
respect to distributions and the waiver of preference actions 
against unsecured creditors.   
                                              
2 The First Amended Plan incorporated an agreement 
with the Committee (the “Committee Agreement”) providing 
for: (i) a distribution to unsecured creditors of $1.25 million 
over seven years, (ii) a non-compete clause binding the 
Heverlys and their relatives until all payments were made to 
unsecured creditors, and (iii) waiver of preference actions 
against unsecured creditors.  
3 Szigethy is the founder, co-owner, and Co-CEO of 
The Riverside Company, a global private equity firm holding 
over $3 billion in assets. 
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On March 5, 2013, after holding a five-day 
confirmation hearing, and over the objection of Appellant, 
Bankruptcy Judge Winfield entered an order (the 
“Confirmation Order”) confirming the Plan.4  The 
Confirmation Order was automatically stayed for fourteen 
days pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
3020(e).  Appellant moved for a stay pending appeal, which 
was denied.  The Bankruptcy Court also denied a request by 
the Debtor to shorten the automatic fourteen-day stay.5  The 
parties briefed the merits of the appeal, but the District Court 
                                              
4 Appellant, the sole objector to the Plan, opposed 
confirmation on the basis that, inter alia, the Plan violated the 
absolute priority rule under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) by allowing 
equity holders to retain property without paying unsecured 
creditors in full. 
5 On March 18, 2013, Appellant filed Notices of 
Appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s Confirmation Order and 
the Bankruptcy Court’s Order denying Appellant’s motion for 
a stay pending appeal.  On March 19, 2013, the final day of 
the automatic stay, Appellant filed an emergency application 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8005 
seeking to temporarily stay the Confirmation Order, and 
requesting that the Court order appellees to show cause as to 
why a stay pending appeal should not issue.  Once the District 
Court denied its application, Appellant appealed that decision 
to the Third Circuit, which upheld the denial of the stay.  
Appellant subsequently sought injunctive relief from the 




never reached those issues, as it granted the Debtor’s motion 
to dismiss the appeal as equitably moot on June 24, 2013. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
158(d) and 1291. 
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 
decision that a bankruptcy appeal is equitably moot.  
Continental, 91 F.3d at 560.   
III. Analysis 
a. Appellant’s Challenge to the Equitable 
Mootness Doctrine 
As an initial matter, Appellant asserts that the 
equitable mootness doctrine is unconstitutional and contrary 
to the Bankruptcy Code.  Because we have already approved 
the doctrine of equitable mootness in Continental,6 only the 
                                              
6 It should be noted that nearly all of the other Courts 
of Appeals with jurisdiction to hear bankruptcy appeals have 
endorsed some form of the equitable mootness doctrine.  See 
In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 136 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1998); In 
re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 691 F.3d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., 663 F.3d 704, 713–14 
(4th Cir. 2011); In re Scopac, 624 F.3d 274, 281–82 (5th Cir. 
2010); In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 563–65 




Court sitting en banc would have the authority to reevaluate 
our prior holding.  See United States v. White, 748 F.3d 507, 
512–13 (3d Cir. 2014).7  This Court may only decline to 
follow a prior decision of our Court without the necessity of 
an en banc decision when the prior decision conflicts with a 
Supreme Court decision.  See Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. 
Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011); see 
also Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 179 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (Smith, J., concurring) (“‘[E]ven in constitutional 
cases’ . . . , the doctrine of stare decisis ‘carries such 
persuasive force’ that departing from it has ‘always required’ 
some ‘special justification.’”) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 
467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).   
                                                                                                     
Cir. 1994); In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869, 879–
83 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 1327, 1337–38 (10th 
Cir. 2009); In re Lett, 632 F.3d 1216, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 
2011); In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1147–48 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986).  The Eighth Circuit has yet to address the merits 
of the doctrine’s applicability in a precedential opinion.  
Compare In re Nevel Props. Corp., 765 F.3d 846, 848 & n.3 
(8th Cir. 2014) (affirming on the merits and denying as moot 
appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal as equitably moot), 
with In re President Casinos, Inc., 409 F. App’x 31, 31–32 
(8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s 
dismissal of bankruptcy appeal as equitably moot).   
7 See also 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1 (2010) (“[N]o subsequent 
panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a 




Appellant argues that our equitable mootness 
jurisprudence should be reevaluated in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).  
Appellant contends that after Stern, a bankruptcy court’s 
ability to enter binding, final judgments in “core” bankruptcy 
proceedings—like plan confirmations—must be subject to 
district court review on appeal under traditional appellate 
standards.  Stern alone does not permit us to depart from 
Continental.   
In Stern, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the question of whether 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) is 
unconstitutional because it gives non-Article III judges the 
power to render final judgments on common law compulsory 
counterclaims that are not necessarily resolved in the process 
of allowing or disallowing the defendant’s proof of claim.  
The Court in Stern found that the provision unconstitutionally 
delegated the judicial power of the United States to non-
Article III bankruptcy judges.  Justice Roberts’s opinion 
relied heavily on Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855), which stated that 
with the exception of certain “public rights,” Congress cannot 
“withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from 
its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law, or in equity, 
or admiralty.”  Because the counterclaim at issue in Stern was 
a tort claim at common law, the Court held that “[t]he 
Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to 
enter a final judgment on [this] state law counterclaim.”  
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.   
Thus, the Court in Stern made clear that non-Article III 
bankruptcy judges do not have the constitutional authority to 
adjudicate a claim that is exclusively based upon a legal right 
grounded in state law despite appellate review of the 
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bankruptcy judge’s decision by an Article III judge.  
However, Stern did not consider the authority of bankruptcy 
judges to make final determinations regarding other kinds of 
claims and counterclaims brought by debtors and creditors, 
nor did Stern consider whether Article III requires appellate 
review of a bankruptcy judge’s decisions by an Article III 
judge.  Accordingly, we are obligated to apply this Court’s 
equitable mootness doctrine notwithstanding Stern.   
b. Equitable Mootness Analysis 
Following confirmation of a reorganization plan by a 
bankruptcy court, an aggrieved party has the statutory right to 
appeal the court’s ruling.  Once a bankruptcy appeal has been 
filed, federal courts have a ‘‘‘virtually unflagging 
obligation’’’ to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them.  
In re Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).  Before there is a basis to 
avoid deciding the merits of an appeal, we must first 
determine that granting the requested relief is almost certain 
to produce a ‘‘perverse’’ outcome— significant ‘‘injury to 
third parties’’ and/or ‘‘chaos in the bankruptcy court’’ from a 
plan in tatters.  In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 
168 (3d Cir. 2012).  Only in such circumstances is equitable 
mootness a valid consideration. 
A court decides to dismiss an appeal as equitably moot 
through the consideration of the following ‘‘prudential’’ 
factors: 
(1) whether the reorganization plan has been 
substantially consummated, (2) whether a stay 
has been obtained, (3) whether the relief 
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requested would affect the rights of parties not 
before the court, (4) whether the relief requested 
would affect the success of the plan, and (5) the 
public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy 
judgments. 
Id. (citing Continental, 91 F.3d at 560).  Depending on the 
circumstances, each factor is given varying weight.  Id. 
(citing In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 
2000)).   
These factors are interconnected and overlapping.  
Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 320 (citing Phila. Newspapers, 690 
F.3d at 168–69).  ‘‘The second factor principally duplicates 
the first in the sense that a plan cannot be substantially 
consummated if the appellant has successfully sought a stay.’’  
Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 169 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In analyzing the first factor, courts have considered 
‘‘whether allowing an appeal to go forward will undermine 
the plan, and not merely whether the plan has been 
substantially consummated under the Bankruptcy Code’s 
definition.’’8  Id. at 168–69.  This collapses the first and 
                                              
8 Substantial consummation is defined in the Bankruptcy 
Code to mean the 
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property 
proposed by the plan to be 
transferred; 
(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the 
debtor under the plan of the business or of the 
management of all or substantially all of the property 




fourth factors.  The third factor adds an additional 
consideration—whether granting relief will undermine ‘‘the 
reliance of third parties, in particular investors, on the finality 
of the transaction.’’  Id. at 169 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  ‘‘Finally, the fifth factor supports the other four by 
encouraging investors and others to rely on confirmation 
orders, thereby facilitating successful reorganizations by 
fostering confidence in the finality of confirmed plans.’’  Id. 
Taken together, these factors require that the equitable 
mootness doctrine be applied only to “prevent[] a court from 
unscrambling complex bankruptcy reorganizations when the 
appealing party should have acted before the plan became 
extremely difficult to retract.”  Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2001).  The party 
seeking dismissal bears the burden to demonstrate that, 
weighing the relevant factors, dismissal is warranted.  
Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321. 
In practice, equitable mootness proceeds in two 
analytical steps: “(1) whether a confirmed plan has been 
substantially consummated; and (2) if so, whether granting 
the relief requested in the appeal will (a) fatally scramble the 
plan and/or (b) significantly harm third parties who have 
justifiably relied on the plan’s confirmation.”  Id.  
“Satisfaction of [the] statutory standard indicates that 
implementation of the plan has progressed to the point that 
turning back may be imprudent.”  Id. 
                                                                                                     
(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.   
 
11 U.S.C. § 1101. 
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If the confirmed plan has been substantially 
consummated, a court should next determine whether 
granting relief will require undoing the plan as opposed to 
modifying it in a manner that does not cause its collapse.  See 
In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d 338, 346–47 (3d Cir. 
2003) (appeal not equitably moot where disgorgement of 
professional fees would not unravel plan); United Artists 
Theatre Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 228 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(appeal not equitably moot where striking indemnification 
provision would leave the plan otherwise intact); PWS, 228 
F.3d at 236 (appeal not equitably moot where plan could go 
forward even if certain releases were stricken).  A court 
should also consider the extent a successful appeal, by 
altering the plan or otherwise, will harm third parties who 
have acted reasonably in reliance on the finality of plan 
confirmation.  Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321. 
c. Application of the Equitable Mootness 
Doctrine 
Since this Court’s adoption of the equitable mootness 
doctrine in Continental, we have emphasized that the doctrine 
must be construed narrowly and applied in limited 
circumstances.  In Philadelphia Newspapers, this Court 
emphasized “that a court only should apply the equitable 
mootness doctrine . . . ‘[in] complex bankruptcy 
reorganizations when the appealing party should have acted 
before the plan became extremely difficult to retract.’”  690 
F.3d at 169 (quoting Nordhoff, 258 F.3d at 185).  “The 
doctrine is quite rightly ‘limited in scope’ and ‘cautiously 
applied.’”  Id. (quoting Continental, 91 F.3d at 559).  Further, 
the doctrine’s “judge-made origin, coupled with the 
responsibility of federal courts to exercise their jurisdictional 
mandate, obliges us . . . to proceed most carefully before 
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dismissing an appeal as equitably moot.”  Semcrude, 728 F.3d 
at 318.   
Our prior dismissals pursuant to the equitable 
mootness doctrine are inapposite here.  Those prior 
applications of the doctrine involved complex bankruptcy 
reorganizations that included multiple related debtors, 
hundreds of millions of dollars in assets, liabilities and 
claims, and hundreds or thousands of creditors.  For example, 
Continental involved the merger of fifty-three debtors with 
Continental, a $110 million investment in the reorganized 
debtor, the transfer by foreign governments of route 
authorities, and the assumption of leases and executory 
contracts worth over five billion dollars.  91 F.3d at 567.  
Similarly, in Nordhoff, the reorganization plan required 
eighteen months of preparation between several parties, the 
exchange of over $100 million in bonds, the issuance of new 
stock, the extension of a sixty million dollar credit facility, 
and the exchange and cancellation of over $100 million of 
debt.  258 F.3d at 182, 186. 
In contrast here, the Debtor’s reorganization involved 
a $200,000 investment in the reorganized debtor and only one 
secured creditor that held a blanket lien on the Debtor’s assets 
for less than $100,000.  Further, the Debtor had only 
seventeen unsecured creditors, not including insiders.  In 
addition, the Plan did not provide for new financing, mergers 
or dissolutions of entities, issuance of stock or bonds, name 
change, change of business location, change in management 
or any other significant transactions.  The record illustrates 
that this case did not involve a sufficiently complex 
bankruptcy reorganization such that dismissal on the basis of 
equitable mootness would be appropriate.   
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Consideration of the prudential factors also 
demonstrates that the District Court abused its discretion.  
The District Court found that the Plan was substantially 
consummated.  The Debtor transferred all property required 
to be transferred on or shortly after the effective date of the 
Plan, and the reorganized debtor commenced distributions 
under the Plan.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2)(C) (requiring only 
the “commencement of distribution under the plan”).  The 
District Court observed that Appellant failed to obtain a stay.  
We do not dispute those determinations.  However, the 
District Court also found that granting relief to Appellant 
would lead to a perverse outcome by causing the Plan to be 
fully unraveled, resulting in significant harm to third parties.  
We disagree.  In our judgment, the proper application of the 
prudential factors does not permit dismissal on equitable 
mootness grounds.   
As noted, the first and fourth prudential factors require 
that a court consider whether allowing an appeal to go 
forward will undermine the plan.  Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321.  
In finding that these factors weigh in favor of equitable 
mootness, the District Court found that Appellant “offered no 
options which would allow the Court to grant it relief without 
[unscrambling the Plan] entirely.”  In re One 2 One 
Commc’ns, LLC, No. 13-1675, 2013 WL 3864056, at *6 
(D.N.J. July 24, 2013).  In reaching this conclusion, the 
District Court erred in two fundamental respects:  it placed 
the burden on Appellant to demonstrate that this factor 
weighed in its favor, and it concluded that because granting 
Appellant’s requested relief would reverse the Plan, this 
factor necessarily favored the Debtor.   
To the contrary, it was the Debtor’s burden, as the 
party seeking dismissal, to demonstrate that the prudential 
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factors weighed in its favor.  See Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321.  
Further, courts are obligated to consider not only whether 
granting the requested relief would require reversal of the 
plan, but also whether the plan could be retracted without 
great difficulty and inequity.  See Nordhoff, 258 F.3d at 186.  
We have noted in prior cases that reversal of a confirmation 
order is more likely to lead to an inequitable result “where the 
reorganization involves intricate transactions or where outside 
investors have relied on the confirmation of the plan.”  
Continental, 91 F.3d at 560–61 (citations omitted); see also 
Nordhoff, 258 F.3d at 186 (finding that plan that involved 
hundreds of millions of dollars, the issuance of unretractable 
bonds, and restructuring the debt, assets, and management of 
a major corporation “could [not] be reversed without great 
difficulty and inequity”).  We have most frequently found that 
a plan could not be retracted when the reorganized debtor 
issued publically traded debt or securities.  See, e.g., 
Nordhoff, 258 F.3d at 186.  
Here, the Plan did not involve intricate transactions 
and the Debtor did not present sufficient evidence that the 
Plan would be difficult to unravel.  Instead, the Debtor 
identified various post-confirmation transactions entered into 
in the ordinary course of the reorganized Debtor’s business.  
These routine transactions, including the investment by the 
Plan Sponsor, the commencement of distributions, the hiring 
of new employees and entering into various agreements with 
existing and new customers are likely to transpire in almost 
every bankruptcy reorganization where the appealing party is 
unsuccessful in obtaining (or fails to seek) a stay.  Further, the 
Plan did not involve the issuance of any publicly traded 
securities, bonds, or other circumstances that would make it 
difficult to retract the Plan.  Accordingly, the District Court 
 17 
 
abused its discretion in finding that the first and fourth factors 
favored the Debtor.   
Furthermore, under the third factor, “the reliance by 
third parties, in particular investors, on the finality of the 
[Plan’s confirmation]” is minimal.  Continental, 91 F.3d at 
562.  The District Court articulated no specific harm that 
would inure to the detriment of third parties and instead stated 
that, “One2One argues that the relief Appellant seeks would 
unravel the Plan in its entirety and call into question the 
continued viability of One2One to the detriment of third 
parties.”  One 2 One Commc’ns, 2013 WL 3864056, at *8.9  
However, as the District Court noted, “[t]his is not a case 
where a debtor issued publicly traded securities or debt 
pursuant to a plan that third parties to the bankruptcy case 
could have purchased on the open market.”  Id. at *7 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Nevertheless, the Debtor now argues that allowing 
Appellant’s appeal to be heard on the merits would inevitably 
affect the rights of parties not before the court such as 
creditors, employees, and third-party workers.   
This type of minimal third-party reliance is present in 
nearly all bankruptcy reorganizations and cannot be 
characterized as almost certain to cause significant injury to 
                                              
9 Indeed, the Debtor concedes on appeal that the risk of 
harm is speculative: “granting the Appellant’s requested relief 
would potentially jeopardize the Reorganized Debtor’s 
successful emergence from chapter 11 and seriously threaten 
the viability of its ongoing business.”  Appellee’s Br. 42 
(quoting App. 3161) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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third parties.  Cf. Continental, 91 F.3d at 556 (emphasizing 
that the record was replete with evidence that investing 
parties not before the court relied on the confirmation order in 
making decision to enter into a $450 million investment 
agreement under a complex arrangement).  In light of the 
limited evidence of potential third-party injury, the District 
Court also abused its discretion in determining that this factor 
favored the Debtor.  
Finally, the prudential consideration of public policy 
weighs in favor of providing Appellant with appellate review 
of its bankruptcy appeal.  “Though the finality of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision necessarily will be disturbed,” 
this Court has recognized an appealing party’s “statutory right 
to review of the [Bankruptcy] Court’s decision.”  Phila. 
Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 171.  Further, “[t]he presumptive 
position remains that federal courts should hear and decide on 
the merits cases properly before them.”  Semcrude, 728 F.3d 
at 326.   
Here, Appellant has repeatedly advanced the 
contention that it is entitled to appellate review.  Appellant 
objected to the Plan, applied for a stay, filed an appeal of the 
Confirmation Order and sought emergency appellate review.  
In light of the other prudential factors, denying Appellant 
review now would be distinctly inequitable.10   
                                              
10 Appellant also argues on appeal that the District 
Court abused its discretion by dismissing its appeal of the 
third-party releases in the Plan.  In light of our finding that the 





Absent en banc reconsideration, we cannot entertain 
Appellant’s challenge to equitable mootness, as Continental 
remains the law of this circuit.  Because the District Court 
abused its discretion under Continental, we will reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal and remand for its consideration of 
Appellant’s bankruptcy appeal on its merits.   
                                                                                                     
entire appeal as equitably moot, we need not consider 
Appellant’s separate argument as to the third-party releases.   
In re: One2One Communications, LLC, No. 13-3410 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I agree wholeheartedly with the majority’s equitable 
mootness analysis, which we are compelled to undertake 
under our controlling precedent.  I write separately, however, 
because I do not believe we should persist in our failed 
attempts to cabin this legally ungrounded and practically 
unadministrable “judge-made abstention doctrine.”  In re 
Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2013).  Rather, 
the time has come to reconsider whether it should exist at all, 
and, if we conclude it should, to reform it substantially. 
 Although we adopted equitable mootness en banc in In 
re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), 
neither the constitutional nor the statutory basis for the 
doctrine were challenged in that case, and the Court was still 
nearly evenly divided—with then-Judge Alito leading the 
dissent.  See id. at 568 (Alito, J., dissenting).  The doctrine 
was designed to be “limited in scope and cautiously applied,” 
specifically in highly complex cases where limited relief was 
not feasible and upsetting a reorganization would cause 
substantial harm to numerous third parties.  Id. at 559 
(majority opinion).  In the nearly twenty years since we 
launched that experiment, it has proved highly problematic, 
with district courts continuing to dismiss appeals in the 
simplest of bankruptcies.  Further, as courts and litigants 
(including Appellees) have struggled to identify a statutory 
basis for the doctrine, it has become painfully apparent that 
there is none.  Moreover, a series of Supreme Court decisions 
since our adoption of the doctrine makes clear that, whatever 
doubts we set aside twenty years ago to embrace the doctrine, 
it cannot survive constitutional scrutiny today.  I therefore 
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urge our Court to consider eliminating, or at the very least, 
reforming, equitable mootness. 
I. 
 I begin with our experience with the doctrine.  
Equitable mootness was intended to “provide[] a vehicle 
whereby the court can prevent substantial harm to numerous 
parties,” namely where “the reorganization involves intricate 
transactions or where outside investors have relied on the 
confirmation of the plan.”  Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 559-60 
(citations omitted).  What Continental Airlines spawned is a 
different species altogether.  We have repeatedly admonished 
that the doctrine applies only to attempts to “unscrambl[e] 
complex bankruptcy reorganizations,” Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. 
Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(emphasis added),1 and even then “‘is limited in scope and 
should be cautiously applied,’” id. (quoting In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000)),2 as well as 
that it is inapplicable when limited relief is available on 
appeal, Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 323.3  Yet district courts have 
                                              
1 See also In re Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d 161, 169 
(3d Cir. 2012) (reciting Nordhoff Investments); In re Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). 
 
2 See also Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 170 (reciting 
the same proposition as stated in Cont’l Airlines); Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d at 343 (same). 
 
3 See also Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 170; Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d at 346; United Artists Theatre Co. v. 




continued to invoke the doctrine in modest, non-complex 
bankruptcies and where appellants have sought limited relief.    
 We have also rejected invitations to extend equitable 
mootness outside its intended context, i.e., appeals from 
confirmation orders.  See In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 552 
n.55 (3d Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether equitable 
mootness applied to class settlement); id at 557 (Ambro, J., 
dissenting) (cautioning that extending “the controversial 
doctrine of equitable mootness, which applies only to 
attempts to unscrambl[e] complex bankruptcy 
reorganizations,” to class settlement was inappropriate 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
But our district courts have not been so discriminating.  See 
In re Jevic Holding Corp., Nos. 13-104 & 13-105, 2014 WL 
268613, at *4 (D. Del. Jan. 24, 2014) (applying equitable 
mootness to dismiss an appeal from an order approving a 
settlement and structured dismissal).  In fact, the doctrine has 
even been invoked by bankruptcy courts to dismiss motions 
to revoke reorganization plans.  See, e.g., In re Innovative 
Clinical Solutions, Ltd., 302 B.R. 136, 140-42 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2003); cf. In re Machne Menachem, Inc., 371 B.R. 63, 73-75 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006) (applying equitable mootness factors 
but declining to dismiss on equitable mootness grounds).       
 Since Continental Airlines, we have reversed findings 
of equitable mootness or declined to dismiss appeals as 
equitably moot no less than seven times.  See In re SCH 
Corp., 569 F. App’x 119, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (not 
precedential) (reversing a finding of equitable mootness); 
Semcrude, 728 F.3d 314 at 323 (same); Phila. Newspapers, 
690 F.3d at 170 (same); Zenith Elecs. Corp., 329 F.3d at 346 
(same); United Artists, 315 F.3d at 228 (declining to dismiss 
as equitably moot an appeal from a district court exercising 
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original jurisdiction over a bankruptcy case); PWS, 228 F.3d 
at 237 (same); In re Cont’l Airlines (Continental II), 203 F.3d 
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to dismiss appeal as 
equitably moot because the debtor had not preserved the 
issue, but noting that equitable mootness did not apply). 
 This case is only the most recent example, but it 
epitomizes the problem.  As the majority explains, what we 
have is a small, garden-variety bankruptcy.  Quad’s appeal 
did not implicate intricate transactions that would be difficult 
to unravel, nor did it pose a significant risk of injuring third 
parties.  Further, in the event the Plan could not be undone, 
Quad urged the District Court to grant the limited relief of 
striking third-party releases from the Plan.  The District Court 
nonetheless dismissed Quad’s timely and repeated requests 
for appellate review on “equitable mootness” grounds.  That 
yet another thoughtful and diligent District Judge has 
misconstrued our case law as permitting the abdication of 
jurisdiction in these circumstances reflects a doctrine adrift 
and in need of reconsideration by our Court.     
II. 
 So what is the constitutional or statutory anchor for 
declining to exercise jurisdiction over bankruptcy appeals 
dubbed “equitably moot”?  Simply put, there is none. 
The mandate that federal courts hear cases within their 
statutory jurisdiction is a bedrock principle of our judiciary.  
As Chief Justice Marshall wrote long ago, “[w]e have no 
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the 
other would be treason to the [C]onstitution.”  Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).  Dismissing 
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appeals in the name of equitable mootness violates this 
“virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them.”  Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976).  Then-Judge Alito recognized as much in Continental 
Airlines, rebuking the majority for “throw[ing] [the 
appellants] out of court without reaching the merits of their 
arguments . . . even though (a) th[e] case [was] clearly not 
‘moot’ in any proper sense of the term, (b) we unquestionably 
ha[d] statutory jurisdiction, and (c) we have a ‘virtually 
unflagging obligation’ to exercise the jurisdiction that we 
have been given.”  Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 568 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817).   
 While we have referred to equitable mootness as a 
“judge-made abstention doctrine,” Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 
317, it is not among the handful of narrow and deeply rooted 
abstention doctrines recognized by the Supreme Court, 
namely, Pullman, Burford, Younger, and Colorado River.4  
                                              
4 See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818 (abstaining from 
hearing cases that are duplicative of a pending state 
proceeding); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-54 (1971) 
(abstaining from hearing cases that would interfere with a 
pending state criminal proceeding); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 
319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943) (abstaining where adjudication 
in federal court would unduly intrude into the processes of 
state government or undermine the state’s ability to maintain 
desired uniformity); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (abstaining from cases in which the 
resolution of a federal constitutional question might be 
obviated if the state courts were given the opportunity to 
interpret ambiguous state law); see also Quackenbush v. 
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Those doctrines, much like the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, proceed from the premise that “[i]n rare 
circumstances, federal courts can relinquish their jurisdiction 
in favor of another forum.”  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) (emphasis added).5  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has “on several occasions explicitly 
recognized that abstention ‘does not, of course, involve the 
abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement 
of its exercise.’”  England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 
375 U.S. 411, 465 (1964) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)).  But where 
there is no other forum and and no later exercise of 
jurisdiction, as in the case of equitable mootness, 
relinquishing jurisdiction is not abstention; it’s abdication.  In 
short, there is no analogue for equitable mootness among the 
abstention doctrines. 
 Nor is there a likely prospect of the Supreme Court 
either taking an expansive view of an existing doctrine to 
encompass equitable mootness or recognizing equitable 
mootness as a wholly new abstention doctrine.  On the 
contrary, the Court has repeatedly endeavored to narrow the 
scope of the abstention doctrines, particularly within the past 
                                                                                                     
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-23 (1996) (explaining the 
contours of the abstention doctrines).   
5 See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 548-57, 579-87 (1985) 
(describing practices of judicial abstention sounding in 
justiciability, comity, forum non conveniens, separation of 
powers, and other principles and explaining that the range of 




few years.  In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. 
Ct. 584 (2013), for instance, the Court refused to extend the 
three “exceptional” situations where Younger abstention is 
appropriate, reaffirming Chief Justice Marshall’s “early and 
famous[]” assertion of federal courts’ obligation to hear and 
decide cases within their jurisdiction.  Sprint Commc’ns, 134 
S. Ct. at 590-91 (citing Cohens, 6 Wheat. at 404).  The Court 
relied on that assertion again when declining to expand the 
political question doctrine in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), explaining that “the 
Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before 
it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid.’”  Id. at 1427 (quoting 
Cohens, 6 Wheat. at 404).   
And just last year, in Lexmark International, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014), the 
Court confirmed its disapproval of doctrines that permit 
courts to decline to decide claims on “prudential” rather than 
statutory or constitutional grounds, admonishing that such 
doctrines conflict with the Court’s “recent reaffirmation [in 
Sprint Communications] of the principle that a federal court’s 
obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is 
virtually unflagging.”  Id. at 1386 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, 
134 S. Ct. at 591) (internal quotation marks omitted).  After 
concluding the plaintiff’s claim “present[ed] a case or 
controversy that [was] properly within federal courts’ Article 
III jurisdiction,” the Court refused to frame the question 
before it, which was whether the plaintiff had a cause of 
action under a federal statute, as a question of “prudential 
standing” despite using that label in the past.  Id. at 1386-87.  
The Court reasoned:   
We do not ask whether in our judgment 
Congress should have authorized [the 
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plaintiff’s] suit, but whether Congress in fact 
did so.  Just as a court cannot apply its 
independent policy judgment to recognize a 
cause of action that Congress has denied, it 
cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has 
created merely because “prudence” dictates. 
 Id. at 1388 (citation omitted). 
 These recent decisions counsel that equitable mootness 
is not a logical extension of the narrow abstention doctrines 
recognized by the Court and will not be viewed favorably as a 
relatively new prudential one.  See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 
(1989) [hereinafter “NOPSI”] (explaining that the Court’s 
cases “have long supported the proposition that federal courts 
lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction 
that has been conferred”).  Rather, this judge-made doctrine 
can survive only if grounded in the Bankruptcy Code or the 
federal statutes conferring bankruptcy jurisdiction—the 
subject to which we now turn.     
III. 
A. 
 The majority opinion in Continental Airlines did not 
engage with any statutory arguments in favor of equitable 
mootness because none were raised.  A review of the 
statutory language, however, reveals that the Bankruptcy 
Code and related jurisdictional statutes provide no support for 
equitable mootness and actually undermine it.   
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 Title 28 outlines federal courts’ bankruptcy 
jurisdiction.  Section 1334 gives district courts original 
jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, while § 157 allows them 
to refer cases to bankruptcy courts.  28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 
1334(a).  The statute explicitly makes the bankruptcy court’s 
authority to enter orders, including confirmation orders, 
“subject to review” by the referring district court.  Id. § 
157(b)(1).  In turn, § 158 provides that the district courts 
“shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals” from bankruptcy 
courts.  Id. § 158(a).  Neither § 157 nor § 158 states or 
implies that district courts may decline to exercise that 
jurisdiction by dismissing an appeal as equitably moot. 
 Appellees point to § 1334(c)(1), which provides that 
“nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest 
of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or 
respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a 
particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or 
related to a case under title 11.”  Id. § 1334(c)(1).  That 
provision, however, provides no support for equitable 
mootness.  To begin, § 1334 cannot be read to authorize 
district courts to abstain from exercising their appellate 
jurisdiction when it refers to the original jurisdiction of the 
district courts, not to appellate jurisdiction at all.  See id. § 
1334(a); In re Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 544 F.3d 524, 528 
(3d Cir. 2008).     
 Moreover, § 1334 allows abstention “in the interest of 
justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect 
for State law.”  Equitable mootness no doubt does not involve 
the latter.  As to the former, it could be argued that preserving 
a reorganization plan may serve the “interest of justice.”  But 
how is it “just” to bar a potentially meritorious appeal when 
an appellate court—after hearing the merits of the appeal— 
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instead could use its equitable authority to fashion a limited 
remedy while still protecting third parties that may be harmed 
if a plan is undone?  See Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 324-25 (citing 
Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 571-72 (Alito, J., dissenting)) 
(“[T]he feared consequences of a successful appeal are often 
more appropriately dealt with by fashioning limited relief at 
the remedial stage than by refusing to hear the merits of an 
appeal at its outset.”); see also NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 358-59 
(noting that while federal courts “lack the authority to abstain 
from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred,” 
they retain “discretion in determining whether to grant certain 
types of relief”). 
 Additionally, if § 1334(c) were the basis for equitable 
mootness, our construction of the doctrine (and every other 
Circuit’s) would violate § 1334(d), which provides:  “Any 
decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsection 
(c) . . . is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court 
of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of this title or 
by the Supreme Court of the United States under section 1254 
of this title.”  28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (emphasis added).6  Yet we 
have never interpreted § 1334 to bar our review of district 
court orders dismissing bankruptcy appeals on equitable 
mootness grounds.  On the contrary, dating back to 
Continental Airlines, we have not only reviewed such 
decisions, but have often reversed them.  Thus, interpreting § 
1334(c) as the statutory basis for equitable mootness would 
                                              
 6 Section 1334(d) operates much like § 1447(d), which 
precludes review of orders remanding removed cases to state 
court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding a case 
to the State court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”).      
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be incompatible with our case law, as well as the language 
and structure of § 1334.  
 Finally, the legislative history of § 1334(c) is devoid of 
any mention of equitable mootness.  It indicates the provision 
was enacted to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and to avoid constitutional concerns 
with having state law claims resolved in federal courts.  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-882 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 1984 WL 37391.  The Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 1334 in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 
(2011), reinforces that Congress’s intent was to authorize 
bankruptcy courts to abstain from hearing state law claims in 
certain circumstances—not to allow district courts to abdicate 
their appellate jurisdiction: 
[T]he framework Congress adopted in the 1984 
Act . . . contemplates that certain state law 
matters in bankruptcy cases will be resolved by 
judges other than those of the bankruptcy 
courts.  Section 1334(c)(2), for example, 
requires that bankruptcy courts abstain from 
hearing specified non-core, state law claims that 
“can be timely adjudicated[ ] in a State forum of 
appropriate jurisdiction.”  Section 1334(c)(1) 
similarly provides that bankruptcy courts may 
abstain from hearing any proceeding, including 
core matters, “in the interest of comity with 
State courts or respect for State law.” 
Id. at 2619-20 (second alteration in original).  Thus, the 
language, structure, and legislative history of § 1334, as well 
as its interpretation by the Supreme Court, indicate that 
12 
 
Congress did not intend an equitable mootness exception to 
the federal courts’ appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. 
 Appellees urge that the “most plausible” basis for the 
doctrine is that the Bankruptcy Code “express[es] a policy 
favoring the finality of bankruptcy decisions” through 11 
U.S.C. §§ 363(m),7 364(e),8 and 1127(b),9 and equitable 
                                              
 7 Section 363(m) provides: “The reversal or 
modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection 
(b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not 
affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization 
to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good 
faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the 
appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were 
stayed pending appeal.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  
 
 8 Section 364(e) provides: “The reversal or 
modification on appeal of an authorization under this section 
to obtain credit or incur debt, or of a grant under this section 
of a priority or a lien, does not affect the validity of any debt 
so incurred, or any priority or lien so granted, to an entity that 
extended such credit in good faith, whether or not such entity 
knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization 
and the incurring of such debt, or the granting of such priority 
or lien, were stayed pending appeal.”  11 U.S.C. § 364(e). 
 
 9 Section 1127(b) provides: “The proponent of a plan 
or the reorganized debtor may modify such plan at any time 
after confirmation of such plan and before substantial 
consummation of such plan, but may not modify such plan so 
that such plan as modified fails to meet the requirements of 
sections 1122 and 1123 of this title. Such plan as modified 
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mootness fills a gap in the Code created by the absence of a 
provision limiting appellate review of plan confirmation 
orders.  Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 317-18.  But then-Judge Alito 
aptly explained why we should reject this argument in his 
Continental Airlines dissent:  “[N]arrow provisions” such as 
§§ 363(m) and 364(e), “which merely prevent the upsetting of 
certain specific transactions if stays are not obtained,” cannot 
support the broad doctrine of equitable mootness.  91 F.3d at 
570 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  By their terms, 
§§ 363(m) and 364(e) do not prevent an appellate court from 
hearing an appeal, or even from granting a particular remedy; 
they simply prevent the appellate court’s remedy from 
affecting certain transactions.  See Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 499 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Section 1127(b) provides even less support for equitable 
mootness, as it only restricts a party’s ability to modify a plan 
before confirmation; it says nothing about the powers of 
bankruptcy courts or appellate courts.   
 Moreover, rather than establish a general “policy” 
supporting equitable mootness, these provisions weigh 
against the doctrine.  Because Congress specified certain 
orders that cannot be disturbed on appeal absent a stay, basic 
canons of statutory construction compel us to presume that 
Congress did not intend for other orders to be immune from 
appeal.  See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983); 
Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980).  
While the federal courts must fill statutory gaps in some 
                                                                                                     
under this subsection becomes the plan only if circumstances 
warrant such modification and the court, after notice and a 
hearing, confirms such plan as modified, under section 1129 
of this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 1127(b). 
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exceptional circumstances, see, e.g., United States v. Little 
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973), we may not 
stretch a statute to create such gaps, and we generally 
acknowledge gaps to provide relief, not to deny relief which 





 Even if there were a reading of the statute that 
supported equitable mootness, we would be compelled to 
reject it because of the serious constitutional questions that 
reading would raise.  See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. 
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 237 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
Article III of the Constitution imposes certain 
requirements on officials who exercise the judicial power of 
the United States, U.S. Const. art. III § 1, but Congress often 
charges officials who are not required to meet those criteria 
with ruling on certain kinds of claims.  Adjudication by such 
non-Article III tribunals, including bankruptcy courts, raises 
two distinct constitutional concerns.  The first is the 
infringement on a litigant’s “entitlement to an Article III 
adjudicator,” a personal right recently reaffirmed in Wellness 
International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 
(2015).  While that right can be waived, id., bankruptcy 
appellants whose appeals are dismissed as equitably moot 
clearly do not do so.  Moreover, because they lack an 
alternative forum in which to pursue their claims against a 
debtor, most creditors do not truly consent to bankruptcy 
adjudication in the first place, see Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614, 
let alone adjudication without any appellate review. 
The second is a non-waivable, structural concern that a 
“congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of 
Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal” would 
“impermissibly threaten[] the institutional integrity of the 
Judicial Branch.”  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
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Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); see Wellness Int’l, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1944.  In determining whether such an intrusion occurs, 
the Court scrutinizes among other things “the extent to which 
the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to 
Article III courts.”  Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.  Appellate review 
by an Article III judge is crucial to that determination.  See, 
e.g., id. at 853.10 
Accordingly, over eighty years ago in Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the Supreme Court upheld a 
system of adjudication by an administrative agency on the 
rationale that “the reservation of full authority to [an Article 
III] court to deal with matters of law provide[d] for the 
appropriate exercise of the judicial function.”  Id. at 54.  The 
availability of Article III review was also essential to the 
Court’s approvals of agency adjudications in Thomas v. 
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 
(1985), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).  Similarly, in United States 
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), the Court upheld decision-
making by magistrate judges only because “the ultimate 
decision is made by the district court.”  Id. at 683; see also 
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 83 (“Critical to the Court’s 
decision to uphold the Magistrates Act was the fact that the 
ultimate decision was made by the district court.”).   
                                              
10 One prominent commentator has argued that review 
by an Article III judge is both necessary and sufficient to 
uphold adjudication by any non-Article III judge.  See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative 




Applying these principles in the bankruptcy context, 
the Supreme Court held in Northern Pipeline and Stern that 
because a bankruptcy court is not an Article III court, it may 
not enter final judgments regarding certain kinds of claims 
(which have since been dubbed “Stern claims”) even when 
the bankruptcy judge’s decision will be reviewed on appeal 
by an Article III judge.  See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620; 
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86-87 (plurality opinion); see 
also id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).  
Most recently, in Wellness International, the Court approved 
adjudication of Stern claims by bankruptcy judges where the 
parties consent, but explicitly premised its decision on the 
existence of appellate review by Article III courts, reasoning 
that “allowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims 
submitted to them by consent does not offend the separation 
of powers so long as Article III courts retain supervisory 
authority over the process.”  135 S. Ct. at 1944 (emphasis 
added). 
Equitable mootness drastically weakens that 
supervisory authority, and therefore threatens a far greater 
“impermissibl[e] intru[sion] on the province of the judiciary,” 
Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-52, than the Court confronted in 
Northern Pipeline, Stern, or Wellness International.  The 
doctrine not only prevents appellate review of a non-Article 
III judge’s decision; it effectively delegates the power to 
prevent that review to the very non-Article III tribunal whose 
decision is at issue.  Although Article III judges decide 
whether an appeal is equitably moot, bankruptcy courts 
control nearly all of the variables in the equation, including 
whether a reorganization plan is initially approved, whether a 
stay of plan implementation is granted, whether settlements or 
releases crucial to a plan are approved and executed, whether 
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property is transferred, whether new entities (in which third 
parties may invest) are formed, and whether distributions 
(including to third parties) under the plan begin—all before 
plan challengers reach an Article III court.   
Put another way, whereas magistrate judges’ and 
administrative agencies’ decisions are at least subject to 
appellate review, equitable mootness not only allows 
bankruptcy court decisions to avoid review, but also enables 
bankruptcy judges to insulate their decisions from review at 
their discretion.  In turn, opportunistic plan proponents can 
(and as discussed below, regularly do) use this to their 
advantage.  As then-Judge Alito warned in Nordhoff 
Investments, “our court’s equitable mootness doctrine can 
easily be used as a weapon to prevent any appellate review of 
bankruptcy court orders confirming reorganization plans.  It 
thus places far too much power in the hands of bankruptcy 
judges.”  258 F.3d at 192 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment).   
While historical precedent can justify a delegation of 
judicial power to a non-Article III tribunal,11 equitable 
                                              
11 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 (plurality 
opinion) (“In sum, this Court has identified three situations in 
which Art. III does not bar the creation of legislative courts.  
In each of these situations, the Court has recognized certain 
exceptional powers bestowed upon Congress by the 
Constitution or by historical consensus.  Only in the face of 
such an exceptional grant of power has the Court declined to 
hold the authority of Congress subject to the general 
prescriptions of Art. III.”); see also Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thomas E. Plank, Why 
Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III 
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mootness cannot lay claim to such historical support.  Despite 
the doctrine’s recent acceptance by district courts and courts 
of appeals, the decisions of bankruptcy commissioners, 
referees, and, most recently, judges have always been subject 
to review in courts of law or equity.12  Abdicating that review 
is a modern trend not started by Congress or the Supreme 
Court. 
At the very least, equitable mootness raises serious 
constitutional concerns by failing to provide appellate review 
of bankruptcy judges’ decisions in an Article III court—a 
protection that was present, yet ultimately insufficient to cure 
similar concerns in Northern Pipeline and Stern.  With no 
indication that Congress or the Supreme Court has authorized 
an exception to our “virtually unflagging obligation” to 
exercise our jurisdiction that supports equitable mootness, it 
is not hard to see why the six dissenting members of our 
Court in Continental Airlines were “puzzled and troubled” by 
our adoption of the doctrine without any analysis of its 
origins.  91 F.3d at 568 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
IV. 
Beyond the issues with equitable mootness’s 
legitimacy, I also question its efficacy.  The doctrine was 
intended to promote finality, but it has proven far more likely 
to promote uncertainty and delay.  Ironically, as Chief Judge 
                                                                                                     
Judges, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 567, 607-09 (1998)) (positing that 
“[p]erhaps historical practice permits non-Article III judges to 
process claims against the bankruptcy estate,” but declining to 
reach the issue). 




McKee noted at oral argument in this case, a motion to 
dismiss an appeal as equitably moot has become “part of the 
Plan.”13  Proponents of reorganization plans now rush to 
implement them so they may avail themselves of an equitable 
mootness defense, much like Appellees did here.14    Rather 
than litigate the merits of an appeal, parties then litigate 
equitable mootness.  And even if an appeal is dismissed as 
equitably moot by a district court, that dismissal is appealed 
to our Court, often resulting, in turn, in a remand and further 
proceedings.   
                                              
13 Oral Argument at 48:05-49:35, available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings. 
14 Appellees closed the transactions contemplated by 
the Plan and began distributions under the Plan the day the 
Plan took effect, March 21, 2013.  App. 1522.  Even before 
that, however, Appellees advised the District Court that they 
intended to move to dismiss Quad’s appeal as equitably moot, 
specifically, two days before the Plan took effect during a 
hearing on Quad’s emergency motion for a stay pending 
appeal.  App. 1519; see also Oral Argument at 48:05-48:40, 
available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings.  One month later, Appellees again argued the 
appeal was equitably moot during a hearing on Quad’s 
preliminary injunction motion, which was before the appeal 
had been briefed.  App. 3226.  This is the same kind of 
opportunistic conduct that worried then-Judge Alito in 
Nordhoff Investments. See 258 F.3d at 191 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“It is disturbing that Zenith, in a 
seeming attempt to moot any appeal prior to filing, succeeded 
in implementing most of the plan before the appellants even 




This appeal proves the point.  The Bankruptcy Court 
approved the Plan on March 5, 2013.  Quad then made 
multiple unsuccessful attempts to obtain a stay from the 
Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, eventually filing its 
brief on appeal in the District Court on May 23, about two 
months after the Plan took effect.  One2One filed its brief in 
response about two weeks later, and then filed its motion to 
dismiss the appeal as equitably moot the next day.  All of the 
briefing on both the merits and the motion to dismiss was 
complete by June 25, 2013.  Because the appeal was 
dismissed on equitable mootness grounds, however, we find 
ourselves, nearly two years later and after the parties have 
expended considerable resources on full briefing and 
argument before this Court, concluding that the District Court 
improperly applied the equitable mootness factors and 
remanding for a ruling on the merits—a ruling that itself 
eventually may be appealed.   
How, then, does refusing to hear the merits of the 
appeal achieve finality?  Even if we were affirming the 
District Court’s finding of equitable mootness, there would 
not have been finality until this point, as the possibility of 
reversal has loomed all along.  Without the equitable 
mootness doctrine, on the other hand, the District Court 
would have ruled on the merits long ago.          
Even if the doctrine worked as intended and 
consistently promoted finality, its deleterious effect on our 
system of bankruptcy adjudication presents an independent 
reason to reject it.  By excising appellate review, equitable 
mootness not only tends to insulate errors by bankruptcy 
judges or district courts, but also stunts the development of 
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uniformity in the law of bankruptcy.15  Moreover, the 
significant consequences of a confirmation order, as recently 
recited by the Supreme Court, necessitate appellate review: 
[P]lan confirmation . . . alters the status quo and 
fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. 
When the bankruptcy court confirms a plan, its 
terms become binding on debtor and creditor 
alike. Confirmation has preclusive effect, 
foreclosing relitigation of any issue actually 
litigated by the parties and any issue necessarily 
determined by the confirmation order. Subject 
to certain exceptions, confirmation vests all of 
the property of the bankruptcy estate in the 
debtor, and renders that property free and clear 
of any claim or interest of any creditor provided 
for by the plan. Confirmation also triggers the 
Chapter 13 trustee’s duty to distribute to 
creditors those funds already received from the 
debtor. 
                                              
15 Indeed, the desire for clarity and uniformity led 
Congress to enact 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), the “new statutory 
provision for certification of bankruptcy appeals directly to 
the courts of appeals.”  See In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 
229, 241 (5th Cir. 2009).  “The twin purposes of the provision 
were to expedite appeals in significant cases and to generate 
binding appellate precedent in bankruptcy, whose caselaw has 
been plagued by indeterminacy.”  Id. at 241-42 (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 109-31 pt. I, at 148 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 




Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692 (2015) 
(alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Particularly troubling are dismissals of appeals 
challenging plans that “classify similar claims differently in 
order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on reorganization.”  
In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 251 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 
1279 (5th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
Even if appellants challenging such violations can 
demonstrate “apparent arbitrariness” in the treatment of 
different creditors, courts are likely to find their appeals 
equitably moot, as often “no remedy . . . is practicable other 
than unwinding the plan.”  Id.; accord In re Charter 
Commc’ns 691 F.3d 476, 487-88 (2d Cir. 2012).  Under such 
circumstances, equitable mootness merely serves as part of a 
blueprint for implementing a questionable plan that favors 
certain creditors over others without oversight by Article III 
judges.16  In short, even equitable and prudential concerns 
weigh against equitable mootness.  
                                              
16 See Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors in Support 
of Granting the Petition for Certiorari at 5, Law Debenture 
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2021 
(2013) (No. 12-847), 2013 WL 543337 [hereinafter “Brief of 
Bankruptcy Law Professors”] (“[S]ophisticated parties have 
learned that a ‘pre-packaged’ reorganization plan that is 
designed to be consummated over a weekend may be 
insulated from review by an Article III court even though the 
plan contains terms that would be determined to be unlawful 
if the plan were subjected to judicial review, and those parties 
are increasingly exploiting that opportunity.”); Ryan M. 





We must consider whether to end or endure the 
mischief of equitable mootness.  Although the doctrine has 
been accepted de facto across the Circuits, its legitimacy has 
rarely been scrutinized,17 and this appeal appears to be the 
first in our Circuit in which an appellant has properly 
preserved and disputed the validity of equitable mootness 
under the Bankruptcy Code, the federal statutes conferring 
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and the Constitution.  In fact, aside 
from numerous petitions for certiorari, the doctrine has gone 
virtually unchallenged.18  This may be because litigants—and 
                                                                                                     
Rather than an Axe in Bankruptcy Appeals, 19 J. Bankr. L. & 
Prac. 1 Art. 2 (2010) (“[T]he importance of substantial 
consummation in rendering a claim equitably moot raises 
concerns that a debtor can ‘stack the deck’ in its favor to 
expedite implementation of its plan and foreclose review of 
questionable plan components.”). 
   
 17 See Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 317 (“Courts have rarely 
analyzed the source of their authority to refuse to hear an 
appeal on equitable mootness grounds.”); Murphy, supra note 
16 (“In light of the analysis provided by the dissent in 
Continental Airlines and the scarcity of opinions that tackle 
the question of the origin of equitable mootness, it is difficult 
to discern a coherent underlying rationale that justifies such a 
radical concept.” (footnote omitted)).   
 
18 It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court 
has denied those petitions, as the courts of appeals have rarely 
grappled with the doctrine’s constitutional and statutory 
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bankruptcy attorneys—wield the weapon of equitable 
mootness just as often as they suffer its blows.  But it is time 
for the challenge, and I am not alone in urging it.  A coalition 
of bankruptcy law professors and the United States 
Government have both urged the Supreme Court to hear 
challenges to equitable mootness.19  In any event, the 
doctrine’s widespread acceptance, standing alone, does not 
establish its validity.  After all, the system of bankruptcy 
                                                                                                     
underpinnings.  Regardless, there is no basis for Appellees’ 
contention that the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari 
reflects the Court’s tacit approval of the equitable mootness 
doctrine.  As the Court “ha[s] often stated, the denial of a writ 
of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits 
of the case.  The variety of considerations [that] underlie 
denials of the writ counsels against according denials of 
certiorari any precedential value.”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 296 (1989) (second alteration in original) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States ex 
rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951) (reciting 
the “well established rule that a denial of certiorari does not 
prove anything except that certiorari was denied”).   
 
19 See Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors, supra note 
16, at 2; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. 
GWI PCS 1, Inc., 533 U.S. 964 (2001) (No. 00-1621), 2001 




adjudication struck down in Stern had been unanimously 
upheld by district courts and courts of appeals.20     
Moreover, principles of stare decisis do not compel us 
to continue on this course.  “Revisiting precedent is 
particularly appropriate where, as here, . . . the precedent 
consists of a judge-made rule that was recently adopted to 
improve the operation of the courts, and experience has 
pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings,” Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009), and where “subsequent 
legal developments have unmoored the case from its doctrinal 
anchors,” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 180 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring); see Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[W]e have 
overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have 
undermined their doctrinal underpinnings.”); see also Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
900 (2007) (quoting Dickerson and collecting cases).  
Considering that equitable mootness barely had doctrinal 
anchors to begin with, our dismal experience with it obliges 
us to reconsider Continental Airlines.    
While proponents of the doctrine will emphasize its 
practical importance to the administration of bankruptcy 
estates, there are effective alternatives that do not suffer from 
the prudential, statutory, and constitutional defects of 
equitable mootness.  For instance, in an appropriate case, 
parties can deploy the equitable defense of laches, which 
requires “establish[ing] (1) an inexcusable delay in bringing 
                                              
20 See Brook E. Gotberg, Restructuring the Bankruptcy 
System: A Strategic Response to Stern v. Marshall, 87 Am. 




the action and (2) prejudice.”  In re Mushroom Transp. Co., 
382 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Asbestospray, Inc., 182 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1999)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).  Similarly, where an 
appellant’s bad faith delay prejudices other parties, courts 
have discretion to impose an appropriate remedy, including 
dismissal.  See In re Harris, 464 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(Sotomayor, J.); In re SPR Corp., 45 F.3d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 
1995); In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168, 177 (3d Cir. 1983); see 
also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(2) (“An appellant’s failure to 
take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal 
does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only 
for the district court or BAP to act as it considers appropriate, 
including dismissing the appeal.”).  And, of course, appellate 
courts can expedite briefing schedules and issue orders with 
necessary instructions for the parties and bankruptcy courts in 
advance of full opinions.     
More broadly, courts can address the concerns behind 
equitable mootness, including the extent to which granting 
requested relief will “fatally scramble” an otherwise lawful 
plan or “significantly harm third parties who have justifiably 
relied on the plan’s confirmation,” in fashioning an 
appropriate remedy, rather than abstaining from exercising 
their jurisdiction.  Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321; see also id. at 
324-25 (citing Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 571-72 (Alito, J., 
dissenting)) (“As then-Judge Alito explained, the feared 
consequences of a successful appeal are often more 
appropriately dealt with by fashioning limited relief at the 
remedial stage than by refusing to hear the merits of an appeal 
at its outset.”).   
In many cases, district courts may conclude that all or 
substantially all of the relief requested is feasible despite the 
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plan’s consummation.  See In re Res. Tech. Corp., 430 F.3d 
884, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Unscrambling 
a transaction may be difficult, but it can be done.  No one (to 
our knowledge) thinks that an antitrust or corporate-law 
challenge to a merger becomes moot as soon as the deal is 
consummated.  Courts can and do order divestiture or 
damages in such situations.”); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 
866 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Money had changed 
hands and, we are told, cannot be refunded.  But why not?  
Reversing preferential transfers is an ordinary feature of 
bankruptcy practice, often continuing under a confirmed plan 
of reorganization.” (citation omitted)); Matter of Envirodyne 
Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) 
(“We could order the bankruptcy judge to modify the plan of 
reorganization to reallocate $20 million worth of the stock 
that the 14% noteholders received to the appellants, the 
13.5% noteholders.  Some of the 14% noteholders, it is true, 
have already sold their stock, but they could be ordered to 
surrender some or all of the proceeds to the appellants.”). 
In other cases, the interests of finality and protecting 
third parties will weigh against granting an appellant’s 
requested relief in its entirety.  The availability of only 
limited relief, however, should not prevent adjudication on 
the merits.  “[T]otal relief . . . is not essential to jurisdiction,” 
as “relatively few plaintiffs get all they are seeking in their 
lawsuit.”  Envirodyne, 29 F.3d at 304.  Even if a “bankruptcy 
court might determine that full relief is no longer available to 
[appellants] after substantial consummation,” certainly 
appellants “would readily accept some fractional recovery 
that does not impair feasibility or affect parties not before this 
Court, rather than suffer the mootness of [their] appeal as a 
whole.”  In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 954 (2d Cir. 
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1993).     
 Accordingly, several courts have analyzed equitable 
mootness only after addressing the merits, including the 
Seventh Circuit in Envirodyne, a decision written by Judge 
Posner.  There, following Judge Easterbrook’s decision in In 
re UNR Industries, Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994), 
which banished the term “equitable mootness” from that 
Circuit, the court reasoned that the “[t]he now nameless 
doctrine is perhaps best described as merely an application of 
the age-old principle that in formulating equitable relief a 
court must consider the effects of the relief on innocent third 
parties” and “not a jurisdictional doctrine.”  Envirodyne, 29 
F.3d at 304 (citing Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977)).  As such, the court 
“elide[d] the question of [the doctrine’s] applicability” and 
affirmed the bankruptcy appeal before it on the merits.  Id.21   
                                              
 21 See also SEC v. Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d 323, 
332 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming on the merits rather than 
analyzing equitable mootness); UNR, 20 F.3d at 770 
(considering whether plan challengers had demonstrated a 
“powerful reason” to alter a reorganization plan); cf. United 
States v. Buchman, 646 F.3d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Easterbrook, C.J.) (“Circuits that use [the equitable 
mootness] doctrine dismiss an appeal once a bankruptcy 
auction has been completed or a plan of reorganization 
confirmed and implemented without a stay.  But this circuit 
does not follow that approach.  We have held that the 
possibility of financial adjustments among the parties keeps a 
proceeding alive even if the sale cannot be upset and rights 
under a plan of reorganization cannot be revised.”); United 
States v. Segal, 432 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hile 
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At least two courts have followed Judge Posner’s lead.  
In In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136 (2d 
Cir. 2005), a Second Circuit panel analyzed the merits of an 
appeal before equitable mootness, reasoning that “[b]ecause 
equitable mootness bears only upon the proper remedy, and 
does not raise a threshold question of our power to rule, a 
court is not inhibited from considering the merits before 
considering equitable mootness.”  Id. at 144 (citing 
Envirodyne, 29 F.3d at 303-04).  The court further observed 
that “[o]ften, an appraisal of the merits is essential to the 
framing of an equitable remedy.”  Id.  And the Fourth Circuit, 
in its most recent equitable mootness decision, cited 
Metromedia in adopting the same approach.  Behrmann v. 
Nat’l Heritage Foundation, 663 F.3d 704, 713 n.3 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
Considering the equities after the merits, at the 
remedial stage, offers several advantages over abstaining 
from hearing the appeal altogether.  In many cases, deciding 
the merits of a bankruptcy appeal may require the same if not 
less effort than deciding equitable mootness, especially given 
that a bankruptcy judge’s findings of fact are reviewed for 
clear error.  If so, a court can conserve resources by ruling 
first on the merits, as the court did in Envirodyne.  See 29 
F.3d at 304.  If not, requiring a ruling on the merits can at 
                                                                                                     
we are concerned about trying to unwind the settlement, it is 
difficult to determine the precise effects of such an action . . . 
.  This prevents us from conclusively holding that the 
settlement was so complex or that the changes after the 
settlement have been so sweeping that it would be foolish for 
us to even consider reversing the deal.  Therefore, with some 
reservations, we move on.”). 
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least prevent one cycle of appeals (as a ruling by the District 
Court on the merits of Quad’s appeal might have obviated the 
need for a remand here).22   
Even in an exceptional case, like Continental Airlines, 
where a court arguably cannot grant any relief without 
inequitably harming innocent parties, having a decision on the 
merits is beneficial.  In Metromedia, for instance, the Second 
Circuit determined that the bankruptcy court had improperly 
approved certain nondebtor releases, but ultimately concluded 
it would be inequitable to grant relief considering that the 
appellants had not sought a stay and “none of the completed 
transactions c[ould] be undone without violence to the overall 
arrangements.”  416 F.3d at 144-45.  Nevertheless, the court’s 
decision on the merits has been cited numerous times by 
courts analyzing similar provisions in reorganization plans.  
See, e.g., In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031, 1061 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (relying on Metromedia in analyzing nondebtor 
releases); In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 513 B.R. 
233, 269 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same).  Thus, a ruling on 
the merits of a bankruptcy appeal will promote accuracy and 
uniformity in the law of bankruptcy even if the reviewing 
court finds it impossible to fashion an appropriate remedy.   
                                              
 22 As a recent example, in In re Jevic Holding Corp., --
- F.3d ----, No. 14-1465, 2015 WL 2403443 (3d Cir. May 21, 
2015), the district court there ruled on both the merits of the 
appeal before it and equitable mootness.  We did not address 
equitable mootness, but rather affirmed on the merits.  Had 
the district court not ruled on the merits, we might have had 
to remand for further proceedings.  See id. at *9; see also id. 
at *11 (Scirica, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(agreeing that equitable mootness did not apply). 
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Such cases should be exceedingly rare, however, 
because as long as any remedy, including monetary relief, is 
available, an appellant’s claims are “not ‘moot’ in any proper 
sense of the term,” Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 568 (Alito, J., 
dissenting), and should be heard on their merits.  See Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 720 (2007) (reasoning that a case is not moot where a 
plaintiff seeks monetary relief in their complaint); Church of 
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) 
(explaining that a case is not moot where, although “a court 
may not be able to return the parties to the status quo ante,” it 
“can fashion some form of meaningful relief”); see also 13C 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 
3533.3 (3d ed. 2015) (“Untold numbers of cases illustrate the 





Even if we decide not to revisit equitable mootness, we 
should delineate its contours more precisely and provide 
clearer guidance to the district courts on its appropriate use.  
We made valiant efforts in Semcrude, where we placed the 
burden of demonstrating equitable mootness on the party 
seeking dismissal, emphasized that speculative “Chicken 
Little” statements prophesizing harm to a plan or to third 
parties cannot fulfill that burden, and stressed that “[t]he 
presumptive position remains that federal courts should hear 
and decide on the merits cases properly before them.”  728 
F.3d at 321-22, 324-26.  But the persistent problems in the 
doctrine’s application by district courts reflect that more must 
be done, and there are at least four reforms we could consider 
if we opted to maintain equitable mootness as an abstention 
doctrine.   
First, we could place greater weight on an appellant’s 
attempts to obtain a stay, perhaps permitting dismissal only 
where an appellant does not seek one.23  In such cases, we can 
fairly say “the appealing party should have acted before the 
plan became extremely difficult to retract.”  Nordhoff Invs., 
258 F.3d at 185 (majority opinion).  Indeed, every time we 
                                              
23 The inequity of granting relief where an appellant 
has been less than diligent in obtaining a stay motivated the 
earliest equitable mootness decisions.  See, e.g., In re Roberts 
Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981).  More recent 
decisions from other Circuits have also placed great weight 
on a failure to seek a stay.  See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation 
Co., 677 F.3d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Paige, 584 F.3d 
1327, 1341 (10th Cir. 2009); Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 144. 
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have affirmed a finding of equitable mootness after 
Continental Airlines, the appellant failed to file a motion for a 
stay.  See In re SemCrude L.P., 456 F. App’x 167, 171 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (not precedential) (appellant made an oral motion 
for a stay in the bankruptcy court, but never filed a written 
motion or made any other attempts to obtain a stay); In re 
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 204 F. App’x 144, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (not precedential) (appellant made no attempt to 
obtain a stay); In re SGPA, Inc., 34 F. App’x 49, 52 (3d Cir. 
2002) (not precedential) (same); Nordhoff Invs., 258 F.3d at 
185 (same); see also id. at 191-92 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (agreeing that an appeal was equitably moot 
“primarily” because the appellants had failed to seek a stay). 
Second, we could clarify what constitutes 
“significant[] harm” to “third parties who have justifiably 
relied on plan confirmation.”  Semcrude, 728 F.3d at 321.  
Specifically, who is a “third party,” and when is their reliance 
“justifiable”?  While we should be hesitant to grant relief 
where the effects on third parties would be inequitable, we 
may be less concerned where purported third parties have had 
the opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings 
or on appeal.  Just as opponents of a reorganization plan must 
diligently pursue their claims, so must plan proponents.  See 
Charter Commc’ns, 691 F.3d at 484 (“[T]he relief 
[Appellants] seek would not adversely affect parties without 
an opportunity to participate in the appeal . . . .  Even 
assuming that the relief requested would send Charter back 
into bankruptcy, the parties most affected . . . are either 
parties to this appeal or participated actively in the 
bankruptcy proceedings.” (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)); Paige, 584 F.3d at 1344 (“[B]ecause of 
ConsumerInfo’s pivotal role in the bankruptcy proceedings, it 
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is hard to consider it a ‘third party’ or at least an innocent 
third party.”).   
And we should be even less solicitous of parties who 
act opportunistically or advocate unlawful plan provisions 
during confirmation.  See Charter Commc’ns, 691 F.3d at 484 
(“[I]f the Allen Settlement were unlawful, it would not be 
inequitable to require the parties to that agreement to disgorge 
their ill-gotten gains, participation in the appeal or not.”); 
Paige, 584 F.3d at 1343 (“[W]here . . . the parties attempting 
to convince the court not to reach the merits have accelerated 
the consummation of the plan despite their knowledge of a 
pending appeal . . . we are less inclined to grant their wish 
that the court abstain from reaching the merits on appeal.”); 
Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 244 (“That there might be 
adverse consequences to MRC/Marathon is not only a natural 
result of any ordinary appeal—one side goes away 
disappointed—but adverse appellate consequences were 
foreseeable to them as sophisticated investors who opted to 
press the limits of bankruptcy confirmation and valuation 
rules.”); id. at 244 n.19 (“Equitable mootness should protect 
legitimate expectation of parties to bankruptcy cases but 
should not be a shield for sharp or unauthorized practices.”). 
Third, we could reconsider our standard of review of 
determinations of equitable mootness.  While we opted for 
abuse of discretion review in Continental Airlines, several 
Circuits apply de novo review instead.  See In re United 
Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 2007); In re GWI 
PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d 788, 799-800 (5th Cir. 2000); In re 
Baker & Drake, Inc., 35 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1994); In 
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re Club Assocs., 956 F.2d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 1992).24  The 
Continental Airlines dissent argued that we chose the wrong 
side of this split, as “there is an unbroken and well-
established line of authority from this court holding that 
‘[b]ecause the district court sits as an appellate court in 
bankruptcy cases, our review of the district court’s decision is 
plenary.’”  91 F.3d at 568 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (alteration 
in original) (quoting In re Visual Indus., Inc., 57 F.3d 321, 
324 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Then-Judge Alito added that de novo 
review is appropriate because “[w]e are essentially called on 
to review whether the district court properly decided not to 
reach the merits of [an] appeal,” and “[w]e are in just as good 
a position to make this determination as [a] district court.”  Id.  
Further, equitable mootness is intended to be “limited in 
scope and cautiously applied,” and “plenary review would 
better serve th[o]se ends.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Then-Judge Alito repeated his criticisms in his 
Nordhoff Investments opinion, see 258 F.3d at 192, and we 
echoed his concerns in Semcrude, see 728 F.3d at 320 n.6 
(“We are inclined to agree with this criticism, but nonetheless 
are bound to review for abuse of discretion.”).  Our repeated 
reversals of district courts’ equitable mootness decisions 
indicate a more stringent standard of review would be a 
helpful reform.    
                                              
24 Of course, the fact “[t]hat the courts are creating a 
doctrine unmoored to the Code is illustrated by their 
divergence concerning the appropriate test for equitable 
mootness.”  Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors, supra note 
16, at 11 & n.3 (citing Phila. Newspapers, 690 F.3d at 168-




Finally, we could incorporate into our equitable 
mootness test “a quick look at the merits of [an] appellant’s 
challenge” to determine if it is “legally meritorious or 
equitably compelling.”  Paige, 584 F.3d at 1339.  While no 
substitute for full consideration on the merits that could 
provide guidance for future courts and litigants, a brief look at 
the merits of an appeal and the importance of the issues raised 
is better than none.  See In re Stephens, 704 F.3d 1279, 1283 
(10th Cir. 2013) (observing that until a novel legal question at 
issue on appeal was resolved, “debtors and creditors in every 
individual Chapter 11 case must anticipate the possibility of 
the expense and delay associated with litigation over this 
issue”).  Merits review is particularly important for complex 
questions, like whether a plan comports with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s cram down provisions, an issue that “often cries out 
for appellate review,” Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 244, or 
claims involving conflicts of interest or preferential treatment 
that “go to the very integrity of the bankruptcy process,” 
Paige, 584 F.3d at 1348; see also Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 
at 251 (quoting In re Hilal, 534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 
2008)) (“[E]quity strongly supports appellate review of issues 
consequential to the integrity and transparency of the Chapter 
11 process.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Further, even a preliminary consideration of the 
merits can guide the court’s assessment of the effects of 
granting different forms of relief.  See Metromedia, 416 F.3d 
at 144 (“Often, an appraisal of the merits is essential to the 
framing of an equitable remedy.”).  
What we should not do is ignore the serious problems 
with equitable mootness that are squarely and properly raised 
by this appeal.  Indeed, waiting to resolve the questions 
surrounding the doctrine will only lead other parties and 
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district courts, like those in this case, to waste resources 
litigating equitable mootness.  In sum, while I agree with the 
majority’s application of the precedent that binds our panel, 
that precedent is ripe for reconsideration, and we should 
revisit or at least reform the equitable mootness doctrine. 
